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MEMORANDUM OF PETITIONER

l.

Preliminary Statement:
The Court has asked for a memorandmn addressed to the

question outlined below, and such authority as has been found is presented
therein.

In view of the flood of habeas corpus petitions which annually in-

undate the District Courts, many of which are frivolous but nonetheless
take the valuable time of overburdened Judges, several comments on this
particular case seem appropriate.

For as Mr. Justice Jackson has stated,

concurring in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536-37:
"This Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ
until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the
docket of lower courts and swell our own . . . It must prejudice the
occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless
ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up
with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. 11
Whereas state prisoners acting pro se may be disposed to file petitions
notwithstanding the fact that they have been accorded every ounce of due
process which the law contemplates in the course of state proceedings, and
whereas it is no doubt the pro se petitions which cause the flood of the
dockets, the situation is quite different where responsible counsel are
concerned.

This is not to say that cases wherein lawyers are involved

should be given any sort of special treatment for that reason; indeed, lawyers may be guilty of bringing groundless petitions just as prisoners act-

I
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ing pro se may bring petitions which have merit.

BU: it ought at least to be

assumed that an attorney will not be so irresponsible as to ask a District
Judge to undertake what is admittedly the heavy burden of reviewing a record
so substantial as is the one in the instant case without some just cause for
doing so, at least until the contrary clearly appears.
The Sheppard case has been a raging controversy ever since the day
of the homicide, some nine years ago.

It continues to be "uns ettled" in the

public mind, and desperately needs resolution in some fashion.

It is con-

tended by petitioner that its result is wrong, not only legally but factually;
that is, Sheppard did not receive a fair trial, in the first instance , which is
alone sufficient to warrant action by this court in his favor, but in addition
is not the inurderer which the judgment of conviction asserts him to be.
As was said by Professor Paul Bator, in his recent and exhaustive article
on Federal Habeas Corpus (Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harvard L. Rev. 441, 509);
·~In fact the result of the rather wooden differentiation we now make
between constitutional and nonconstitutional questions is not without
its ironies. Why is it, for instance, that we go so far to allow relitigation of constitutional questions (even where the particular is sue
is closely balanced and technical) and yet do not allow any relitigation
of factual questions of the guilt or innocence of the accused? If a
state prisoner claims that he confessed after he was interrogated for
six hours, not (as the state court found) for four, the law says he may
relitigate the issue, and, perhaps, gain release as a consequence,
even though the evidence of guilt may be overwhelming. But if a
defendant is convicted of murder, and ten years later another person
confesses to the crime, so that we can be absolutely certain that the
defendant was innocent all the time, the law says he must rely on
executive clemency. Why? Why should we pay so little attention to
finality with respect to constitutional questions when, in general, the
law is so unbending with respect to other questions which, nevertheless,
may bear as crucially on justice as any constitutional is sue in the case? '
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And, as it was put by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Rogers v . Richmond, 365 U. ·s. 534:
0

Indeed, many of the cases in which the command of the due process
clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use
of confessions obtained by impermissible methods , independent cor roborating evidence has left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant confessed. Despite such verification, confessions were found to
be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement . . . (and) his conviction failed to afford him that due process
of law which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 11
While it is well that Judges mould be so disciplined as to be able to adhere
to basic principles in favor of the individual, instead of yielding to the
temptation to do rough justice and leave the defendant where he obviously
belongs , it is believed that in this area the element of judicial discretion
has its most essential application.

A litigant who seeks relief on valid

but technical grounds, in the face of undeniable evidence of guilt, may well
be entitled to less discretionary benefit than one who approaches the Cou rt
with an open heart and asserts not only a substantive or procedural flaw ,
but factual innocence.

Such is the petitioner in this ca se.

Many of those who reside in the several correctional i1.stitutions no
doubt assert their innocence, and of those many it is likely that only a few
are sincere.

However, because this Court will exercise discretion not once

but many times in the handling of this petition, the special, even unique,
circumstances of the case at bar should be mentioned .
When the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed petitioner 1 s conviction, in
a sharply divided opinion, there was recorded perhaps the strongest dissent
on guilt in the history of the criminal law.

Judge Taft, joined by Judge Hart,

after stating emphatically that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction, then went so far as to say that the state had by its own evidence
excluded every reasonable hypothesis other than petitioner ' s innocence .

(165Q.

s.

293)
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This Court in the course of oral argument at the time the petition was
filed mentioned the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the Un:ited
States as a factor perhaps reflecting the soundness of the state record. But
that Court has said many times that the denial of certiorari is not to be
taken as any indication whatsoever that the merits had been passed upon or
even considered.

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443.

And in the case at bar,

all doubt has been specifically erased by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who
filed a memorandum opinion when certiorari was denied.

352

u. s.

Sheppard v. · Ohio,

910:

"Such denial of his petition in no wise implies that this Court
approves the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. 11
Without question this could be regarded as an invitation sub silentio by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter to this petitioner to seek relief in the Federal District
Court.

And, curiously, when a state conviction was unanimously reversed

because of pretrial publicity (Ir vin v~ Dowd, 366 U.S. 717) ; Mr. Justice
Frankfurter filed a concurring opinion indicating that upon occasions in the
past the Court had been obliged to refuse review of sirnilar cases, even
though it appeared from the petitions that constitutional violations occasioned
by newspaper trials had taken place;

reading between the lines, and having

in mind the very unusual memorandum opinion described above, one cannot
help but feel that Justice Frankfurter was talking about this case.
Bey md these circumstances, there is one other of no little significance
This action could, of course, have been instituted some time ago. It has
long been urged by many eminent members of the legal profession.

But

because habeas corpus is essentially an equitable proceeding, petitioner
has sought to show to the greatest extent possible "clean hands:" That is,
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a willingness to do all that he is able to carry the burden of proof of his
own innocence.
He has sought to produce evidence favorable to him by submitting to a
polygraph test, participated in by the state, and to hypnosis, to restore a
memory which the record clearly shows to be vague with r espect to events
occurring on the night of the murder.

Polygraph tests are not without

judicial approval (State v. Valdez 371 P. 2d 894, (Ariz. 1962), and the right
to the aid of a hypnotist has been established by sound authority (Cornell v.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P. 2d 447, (195 9 )).

Ohio administrative

officials refused to let petitioner use these ~ethods, and mandamus was
sought in the Ohio Supreme Court.

It was held that the matter rested in the

absolute discretion of the said administrative officials, and that the court
would be powerless to permit or prevent such measures.

( 17 4 O. S. 120)

This ruling has been taken to the Supreme Court of the Uni ted States by
petition for certiorari, which is pending.
Meanwhile, whereas it is plain that Ohio does not want any further
factual development of the case, for one reason and another, petitioner
has at least demonstrated his willingness to exhaust all possibilities of
shedding new light on the situation.

That willingness continues.

Thus, then, stands the Sheppard case.

It should be indicated here

that petitioner is not unaware of the serious burden placed upon this Court
by the review required under the law, and is more than willing to do all
that he can to alleviate the task.

Any and all legal points upon which the

Court desires illumination in the course of the proceedings instant hereto
will be exhaustively briefed and submitted promptly upon the Court's request.
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2.

Question Presented:
To what extent does this Court have discretion with respect to

the issuance of the writ?

3.

Legal Authority:
Anyone undertaking to crystallize the state of the law respecting

Federal Habeas Corpus these days does so at his peril, so rapidly are new
developments emerging.

Several helpful law review articles recently pub-

lished have been rendered all but obsolescent by the rash of Supreme Court
Decisions since the turn of the year.
The duties of the District Jud ge , once a petition for Habeas Corpus
has been filed, are delineated initially in 28 U.S. C. A. s. 2243, which
reads, in part:
"A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ
of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order
directing the respondent to show cause why the wri t should not be
granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant
or the person detained is not entitled thereto."
· Thus it is mandatory that the Court do one of three things:
(a)

(b)
(c)

Determine by examination of the application that the applicant
is entitled to no relief because he either ( 1) fails to allege constitutional violations or (2) has not exhausted state remedies.
Issue the writ, or
Issue an order directing respondent to show cause why the writ
should not is sue.

If the Court dismisses the petition without examining the record, reviewing courts must assume the truth of the allegations in passing upon the
correctness of the dismissal.

In Jennings v. Ragen, 358 U.S. 276, in a

per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court said:

-6-

"It appears fro1n the record before us that the District Court
dismissed petitioner's application without making any examination of
the record of proceedings in the state courts, and instead simply relied on the facts and conclusions stated in the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Illinois. We think that the District Court erred in dismissing
the petition without first satisfying itself, without an appropriate
examination of the state court record, that this was a proper case for
the dismissal of the petitioner's application without a hearing, in accordance with the principles set forth in Brown v . Allen, 344 U .S.
443, 463-465, 506. See also Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220."
The same principle is enunciated in Massey v . Moore, 348 U .S. 105, and
Chessman v . Teets, 350 U.S. 3.
The petition in the instant case clearly sets forth in its allegations of
constitutional violations according to present authority .

Denial of counsel

(House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42) and prejudicial pretrial publicity, where
changes of venue and continuances are denied (Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717)
have been expressly so held.

In House v . Mayo, the Court said: (P. 44)

"It is enough that petitioner had his own attorney and was not
afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with hirrk. 11

Extended citation of the principles to be applied by District Courts
in the disposition of habeas corpus petitions has been for all practical purposes obviated by the recent case of Townsend v. Sain, 83 S. Ct. 745.
In that case the Supreme Court has expressly undertaken to lay down with
as much clarity as is possible the rules and procedures nec::-ssary to proper
handling of these petitions, in syllabus form.

To paraphrase this language

here would be to presume too much, and of dubious value to the Court.
Pages 754-760 of that decision are no doubt intended to clear up the confusion and variance which has heretofore existed in habeas proceedings,
and must be read in their entirety to be completely understood.

The de-

cision reaches not only to the instant problem, but also extends firm
guidelines for the decision as to whether a plenary hearing is necessary,
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a problem with which we are not now but may in the future be confronted.
Although we feel obliged to defer to Chief Justice Warren (Towns end,
above) in phrasing the applicable rules and principles, there is one of
these especially relevant to that initial problem confronting this Court:
"Although the district judge may, where the state court has reliably
found the relevant facts, defer to the state court 1 s findings of fact ,
he may not defer to its finding of law. It is the district judge• s duty
to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings independently. The state conclusions of law may not be given binding
weight on habeas. 11 (p. 760)
Thus it is clear that at a minimum, there must be a review of the record and
judgments upon that record.
Should there be further questions which confront the Court, petitioner
will be happy to furnish such assistance as may be desired or required.

Respectfully submitted,
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